Choices by Lewis Smedes, Chapter 3, "Face the Facts"

Chapter Three really hit a chord and is so relevant for right now. Writing this week's summary is our newest contributor, Melissa Davis. Melissa studied philosophy in college, so this series is right up her alley, and I am so excited to bring her onboard! Melissa and her family live in Brazil. Read more about her on the Contributor's page. -SMW

Choices Chapter Three, "Face the Facts" 

Posted by Melissa Davis 

Having sorted out the categories of morality in chapter 2, Smedes explores how facts shape opinions in chapter 3. He contends we must know the facts before we have the "privilege" of having an opinion, and that this does not just mean the "brute facts. Instead, we filter facts through beliefs, feelings, fears, desires and values, thus transforming brute facts into personalized facts (Smedes 31).


In considering the facts, we first determine which facts are relevant. Smedes gives the example of a man taking action which results in a woman's death. Theoretically, we know it is wrong to do something which leads to someone's death. However, if that man is a doctor and the woman is a severely brain-damaged octogenarian with little chance of recovery, we might conclude that it is right for the doctor to take her off of life-support, an action which would result in her death. Clearly, certain facts were very relevant in arriving at this conclusion: her age, state of health, and minuscule probability of recovery. Other facts, such as her hobbies or her favorite foods, would be irrelevant.


Smedes next contends that facts are interpreted within the context of the "story" in which they occur. If we hear that one man shot another, we ask, "What intentions did each have? What provoked the shooter? What preceded the shooting? What sorts of men were these?" (36). Events are not isolated, so we interpret facts based on their situated-ness.


Thirdly, facts are felt. As Smedes writes, "the daughter of an alcoholic father feels differently about the fact of three-martini lunches than does a man who makes important deals at cocktail parties” (37). Our experiences strongly shape how we feel about facts, and there are two things to keep in mind. First, we must "get above our feelings about things when we make moral choices" (38). Feeling makes a poor substitute for thinking. But secondly, "if we do not feel strongly about bad things, we may be neutralized, lukewarm, indifferent. And indifferent people do not care enough to make responsible choices." (38). Giving a surprisingly timely example, Smedes says that if we don't have strong feelings about racial discrimination, we are "incapable of understanding the deep curse that is racial injustice” (38). So on the one hand, feelings are quick to muddy our thinking when it comes to facts, but on the other hand, many times we cannot properly evaluate the moral depth of a situation if we do not feel strongly what is at stake.


In the final section of this chapter, Smedes states that all facts are evaluated. We weigh every fact’s importance. For a wife whose husband needs an expensive surgery to survive, the fact of its life-saving potential far outweighs the cost of surgery. The insurance company might disagree. Smedes states, "Most great debates about complicated moral issues center on the differences in our values. We disagree about the morality of what is going on because we esteem things differently" (39). When a pro-choice advocate and a pro-life one disagree about what an expectant teen mother should do, they are evaluating the facts differently, one putting a greater value on the teen girl's probable quality of life, the other valuing more the existence of the unborn child. It is impossible to exclude our value systems in fact evaluation, but it is important, too, not to ignore them. We must be honest with ourselves and others about why we evaluate facts as we do.

 

So What?

Smedes’ hardest-hitting conclusion is this: "If we listen to each other while we look at the facts, we may, together, get closer to reality than we could on our own" (41). In order to have the clearest picture of a situation, we must become honest, earnest question-askers. As Smedes repeats, we must be patient listeners, striving to see the world through someone else's eyes. We must admit that we are seeing through a lens, too.


Does this mean we should be relativists, weighing all experiences and conclusions equally? I don't think so. For us who are Christian believers, we hold to a set of beliefs through which we filter the facts--we are in fact seeking the transformation of our thinking by God’s word and Spirit (Romans 12:2). However, I do think there is a clear call to intellectual humility. To reach the best conclusions, to form the best opinions, I must be willing to admit that I might be wrong! I might not have all the facts! I might have misinterpreted them! I might be letting my strong feelings derail me! Another’s feelings about or evaluation of the facts might move me one smidge closer to a more true opinion.


My takeaway, then, is to ask more and better questions of those with differing opinions and different experiences (which is, in fact, everyone). Instead of fearing disagreement or personal failure in expressing my views, I want to ask good questions with an attitude of humility. Not because I'm looking to be swayed or because I think they're "right," but because their story and who they are matters, and I'll do a much better job of holding onto truth when I factor the other in, instead of tuning them out.

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